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Abstract
A spatial analysis of variation in return on investment for crop insurance showed that West Coast wine grape
growers are more inclined to use insurance to maximize short-term net returns than to protect against cash flow
shortages. Growers would benefit from knowing that even if crop insurance does not maximize short-term net
returns, it increases the revenue floor, thereby helping prevent cash flow shortages and vineyard failure. With
crop insurance as the backbone of the U.S. agricultural safety net, an understanding of factors that drive
variation in crop insurance participation can improve agricultural Extension agents' ability to offer programming
on crop insurance issues. Additionally, agents can use publicly available data to replicate the analysis described
in this article for other insured crops.
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Few Oregon wine grape growers purchase crop insurance. This circumstance is confounding to many because
there is an array of market and production risks for Oregon wine grapes, including variation in input markets,
natural disasters, weather, disease, pests, and trade wars (Countryman & Muhammed, 2018). For example,
wildfire smoke taint is an emerging issue that is encouraging many West Coast wine grape growers to
reconsider the role of crop insurance for their vineyards. Furthermore, the crop insurance price (premium) is
highly subsidized by the federal government, and wine grape insurance is widely available through multipleperil crop insurance plans and the Whole-Farm Revenue Protection program (WFRP). (See the appendix for
definitions of premium, multiple-peril crop insurance, Whole-Farm Revenue Protection program, and other
terms used throughout this article.) Oregon had 1,144 vineyards and 33,631 ac of wine grapes in 2017
(University of Oregon, 2018), but only 26% of this acreage was insured, compared to 81% in California and
71% in Washington (U.S. Department of Agriculture Risk Management Agency, 2019).
Extension agents are comfortable with many of the basic strategies farmers use for risk management.
However, agents feel the least qualified to offer educational programs on futures markets and crop insurance
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(Buzby, Skees, & Benson, 1992). This does not bode well for growers, given that the federally subsidized
crop insurance program has been the backbone of the U.S. agricultural safety net since the 2014 Farm Bill
eliminated the direct payments program and developed new crop insurance programs, such as WFRP. One
aspect of crop insurance that is poorly understood is how insurance can protect an operation's cash flow:
cash income minus cash operating expenses. Cash flow is the most important financial indicator for growers
to monitor in the short term because it is the primary component of working capital: all cash available to a
grower in a short period of time. To avoid farm failure, growers need sufficient working capital to pay the
costs of ongoing farming operations. Crop insurance increases the minimum yield or revenue received
(increases the revenue floor), which helps protect an operation's cash flow (Janzen & Carter, 2018).
However, discussions with growers indicate that few of them keep detailed records of their expenses or
develop cash flow statements. Growers often base the decision to purchase crop insurance on whether "it
pays."
Indeed, a review of the literature by Knight and Coble (1997) showed that growers with higher expected
returns on insurance are more likely to insure. Other major findings from the literature were that (a) larger
farm size increases participation in insurance, (b) on-farm diversification (crop and livestock) reduces
participation, and (c) higher yield variability or income risk increases participation, even if the price of
insurance accurately reflects higher expected indemnities (Knight & Coble, 1997). Lee and Sumner (2013)
evaluated the return on investment (ROI) for buy-up coverage for almonds, wine grapes, rice, and cotton in
California for 2002–2011. They found that the ROI was 0.01 for almonds, 0.19 for wine grapes, 1.22 for rice,
and 3.33 for cotton. In other words, the returns for cotton insurance were 330% higher than the costs, but
the returns for wine grape insurance were only 19% higher than the costs. The authors concluded, "We
would expect a high participation rate by almond and grape growers if net benefits from crop insurance
participation for these crops were as high as they are for cotton" (Lee & Sumner, 2013, p. 5).
In this article, I report on a spatial analysis of interstate and intrastate variation in the ROI for crop
insurance. The analysis provides a deeper understanding about the factors that drive variation in crop
insurance participation. The methodology used and findings reported have implications for agricultural
Extension agents in assisting growers with understanding crop insurance issues.

Applying Lee and Sumner's ROI Measure to West Coast Wine
Grapes
I applied Lee and Sumner's (2013) approach to test whether insurance net returns can help explain spatial
variation in wine grape insurance participation in the West Coast region (California, Oregon, and
Washington). With this approach, the expected ROI is evaluated as the net returns of insurance (indemnity
minus the grower cost of insurance) divided by the grower cost of insurance:
ROI = (Indemnity – Premium + Premium Subsidy) / (Premium – Premium Subsidy). (1)
There are three general outcomes associated with this ROI:
1. ROI > 0 is a positive ROI. The net return is positive.
2. ROI = 0 is a zero ROI. The net return is zero.
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A positive expected ROI for insurance is an incentive to purchase insurance, whereas a negative expected
ROI is a disincentive to purchase insurance. ROI = 0 is the break-even case in which the costs and returns of
insurance are equal and there is neither an incentive nor a disincentive to purchase insurance. Nonetheless,
even if the expected ROI is not positive, crop insurance may be worthwhile in the short term because it helps
prevent cash flow shortages and vineyard failure.
I applied the approach to data for 1995–2017 to control for structural and quantitative changes to the federal
crop insurance program. The Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 introduced CAT (the Catastrophic
Risk Protection Endorsement) and significantly increased premium subsidies, both of which would affect the
ROI as calculated with Equation 1. Because the premium for CAT is essentially zero, I evaluated the ROI
separately for CAT and buy-up coverage. It was important to control for these changes because crop
insurance was not purchased in Oregon before the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994. Data from
1995 onward represent a period in which growers in all three states purchased insurance under the same
structural and quantitative characteristics of the federal crop insurance program. The data I used are the U.S.
Department of Agriculture Risk Management Agency's Summary of Business data (U.S. Department of
Agriculture Risk Management Agency, 2018). These data include information on the number of policies sold,
indemnified acres, liability, premium, subsidy, and indemnity for each year, state, county, insurance plan
(actual production history [APH], etc.), and coverage category (CAT or buy-up). I used the Producer Price
Index to adjust all dollar values for inflation, using 1982–1984 as the base period. I aggregated the data by
county and year, resulting in 713 county–year observations for the 1995–2017 period. I also aggregated the
data to evaluate the expected ROI for each state.
The data have two potential sources of bias, adverse selection and moral hazard, both of which arise due to
asymmetric information between insurance providers and growers.
Adverse selection occurs if there is "hidden knowledge" possessed by an insured grower about his or her
probability of loss (Arrow, 1984). Due to growers' hidden knowledge about their risks, the most risky
growers are more likely to purchase crop insurance.
Moral hazard occurs if there is "hidden action" by an insured grower. Insured growers can hide their
actions from insurance providers and therefore have less incentive to implement costly risk management
practices.
All else equal, adverse selection and moral hazard lead to higher indemnity payments, which lead to higher
premiums for the federal government and private insurance companies to maintain solvency of the crop
insurance program. With an increase in premiums, premium subsidy is also expected to increase (not
premium subsidy rates). The net effect on the ROI from increasing indemnity, premium, and premium
subsidy is uncertain. For an actuarially fair insurance program, where indemnity and premium are equal and
then both increase by the same amount, with the premium subsidy rate unchanged, there is no effect on the
ROI. However, other circumstances can lead to an increase or decrease in the ROI. With this county- and
state-level analysis, one must bear in mind that within a county or state, specific vineyards may have
different circumstances.
©2019 Extension Journal Inc.

2

Research in Brief

Analysis Identifies Need to Educate Wine Grape Growers on Crop Insurance Issues

Does It Pay to Purchase Wine Grape Insurance?

JOE 57(5)

The ROI for the period 1995–2017 was positive for both CAT and buy-up coverage in all three states (Table
1). The ROIs for CAT in California, Oregon, and Washington are 4,774, 13, and 603, respectively. This
indicates that on average the returns on CAT are many times higher than the costs. On the other hand, the
ROIs for buy-up coverage in California, Oregon, and Washington are 0.34, 0.15, and 0.12, respectively. This
indicates that the returns for buy-up coverage are 12%–34% higher than the costs. One reason why the ROI
is substantially higher for CAT than for buy-up is that nearly 100% of the CAT premium was subsidized
(Table 1). On the other hand, 55%–57% of the buy-up premium was subsidized. Subsidies increase the value
of the numerator in Equation 1 and decrease the value of the denominator, both of which increase the ROI.
Table 1.
Return on Investment (ROI) and Premium Subsidy Rate for CAT
and Buy-Up Coverage in California, Oregon, and Washington,
1995–2017

ROI
State
California
Oregon
Washington

Premium subsidy rate

CAT

Buy-up

CAT

Buy-up

4,773.53

0.34

100%

56%

12.89

0.15

100%

57%

603.46

0.12

100%

55%

Note. CAT is the Catastrophic Risk Protection Endorsement (see appendix).

Umatilla County is the only Oregon county where historically "it pays" to purchase buy-up coverage from the
grower perspective. With the exception of Umatilla County, which has an ROI greater than 1, all Oregon
counties in which growers purchased insurance have a negative ROI in buy-up coverage (Figure 1). On the
other hand, four out of seven counties in Washington in which growers purchased insurance have a positive
ROI in buy-up coverage. In California, 19 out of 26 counties in which growers purchased insurance have a
positive ROI in buy-up coverage.
Figure 1.
Return on Investment (ROI) in Wine Grape Buy-Up Coverage, 1995–2017
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To Protect Cash Flow or Maximize Short-Term Net Returns?
This article provides empirical evidence that West Coast wine grape growers are more inclined to use
insurance to maximize short-term net returns than to protect against cash flow shortages. If protecting cash
flow were growers' main objective, one would expect a similar insurance participation rate in all three states.
This finding is consistent with my discussions with growers, which indicate that few of them develop cash flow
statements and that they often base the decision to purchase crop insurance on whether "it pays." The
analysis provides several implications for Extension programming:
1. Crop insurance is a risk management tool designed to protect cash flow; it is not a guaranteed payment
program. Growers would benefit from knowing that even if the expected ROI is not positive, crop insurance
can be worthwhile because it increases the minimum yield or revenue received (increases the revenue
©2019 Extension Journal Inc.
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2. The ROI evaluated in this analysis was for wine grape yield insurance (APH), and the evaluation could be
different for revenue insurance (WFRP). In particular, premiums are generally higher for WFRP than for
APH, but additional premium subsidy (the "whole-farm premium subsidy") and higher coverage levels are
offered to farms that insure more than one crop under WFRP (Olen & Wu, 2017).
3. Grower involvement in federal programs can affect program development. For example, Oregon growers
successfully lobbied for red and white wine grapes to be separate commodities under WFRP, allowing
vineyards growing both types of grape to receive the whole-farm premium subsidy. Given that the ROI in
APH buy-up coverage is negative for most Oregon counties, growers may benefit from lobbying for lower
insurance premiums to accurately reflect the expected indemnities.
The approach and findings presented here, as well as the publicly available data I used for the analysis, can
improve the ability of agricultural Extension agents to offer educational programs on crop insurance issues.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture Risk Management Agency (2018) provides publicly available data that
Extension agents can use to replicate the analysis described in this article for any insured crop in the United
States down to the county level.
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Appendix
Glossary of Crop Insurance Terms
Term
Buy-up coverage

Definition/explanation
Any coverage level higher than the basic CAT coverage (55% to 85% coverage in intervals of
5%).

Cash flow

Annual cash income minus cash operating expenses for the production year.

CAT coverage

The Catastrophic Risk Protection Endorsement, which pays 55% of the price of the commodity
established by the U.S. Department of Agriculture Risk Management Agency on crop losses in
excess of 50%. The premium is paid by the federal government; however, growers must pay a
$300 administrative fee (as of the 2008 Farm Bill) for each crop insured in each county.
Beginning, limited-resource, and socially disadvantaged growers may have this fee waived. CAT
coverage is not available on all types of policies.

Indemnity

The amount payable by the insurer to the insured in the event of an insured loss.

Liability

An insurer's financial debt or obligations to the insured; the value of the insured asset.

Loss ratio

Indemnity divided by premium, with a value of 1 representing a program that breaks even and
higher values representing less efficient programs.

Multiple-peril crop insurance

Insurance plans covering multiple causes of crop loss for a single commodity.

Premium

The amount payable by the insured to the insurer for the period of insurance granted by the
policy; the price of insurance.

Premium subsidy

The amount of the crop insurance price (the premium) that is paid by the federal government
on growers' behalf.

Return on investment (ROI)

The indemnity minus the grower cost of insurance, all divided by the grower cost of insurance. A

for crop insurance

positive ROI represents a profitable investment for the grower.

Risk

Exposure to uncertainty.

Insurance that covers revenue losses for one or more commodities under a single insurance
Whole-Farm Revenue
©2019 Extension Journal Inc.
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plan.

Copyright © by Extension Journal, Inc. ISSN 1077-5315. Articles appearing in the Journal become the
property of the Journal. Single copies of articles may be reproduced in electronic or print form for use in
educational or training activities. Inclusion of articles in other publications, electronic sources, or systematic
large-scale distribution may be done only with prior electronic or written permission of the Journal Editorial
Office, joe-ed@joe.org.
If you have difficulties viewing or printing this page, please contact JOE Technical Support

©2019 Extension Journal Inc.

7

